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Abstract. We find the optimal capital income tax rate in an imperfectly
competitive economy, where some part of recourses is devoted to rent-seeking
activity. Optimal tax offsets the difference between marginal social and mar-
ginal private return to capital, which is a result of rent seeking, and the dif-
ference between the before tax interest rate and the marginal productivity of
capital, which arises from imperfect competition. Optimal capital income tax
rate depends neither on other tax rates nor on overall tax burden. Numerically
it is close to zero.
At first glance, the nature of optimal fiscal policy in an imperfectly competi-
tive economy or under decreased returns to scale is clear: pure profit should be
intensively taxed, and subsidies should offset market distortions, which arise from
imperfect competition; in all other respects the policy should be the same as under
perfect competition and constant returns to scale. However, this recommendation is
not applicable in practice, because fiscal authorities cannot distinguish pure profit
from factor remuneration. Thus, it is not possible to tax pure profit without taxing
wages or capital income.
To make the problem of taxation of imperfectly competitive economy more re-
alistic, it is usually supposed that the pure profit tax is either zero or exogenously
given (see Judd 1997, Guo & Lansing 1999, Auerbach & Hynes 2001). In this case,
if higher stock of capital leads to higher economic profit, then the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital should be higher than after-tax interest rate. Besides, subsidies
should offset distortions between marginal productivity of capital and before tax
interest rate, which arise from market power. The optimal capital income tax rate
in such an economy is determined by many factors (consumption and pure profit
taxes, marginal excess tax burden, and others), and its numerical value consider-
ably varies when we slightly change the model structure or its calibration. For
example, Guo and Lansing found that for US economy the optimal capital income
tax rate is somewhere between –10% and +22%.
We take into consideration the fact that once pure profit has been produced, rent-
seeking agents will spend their resources in order to seize it. This hypothesis makes
the analysis more realistic: just as in the real world, we cannot distinguish pure
profit from factor remuneration, and cannot tax them at different rates. Thus, we
1
substitute the traditional hypothesis that pure profit enters into household budget
constraint through a special channel by one that pure profit turns into private factor
remuneration as a result of rent seeking.
We get general and intuitively clear results. Rent seeking distorts factor allo-
cation. If an economy accumulates additional $1 of capital, some part of it, say
ξK , will be used for production of final goods, and the rest, 1 − ξK , for rent seek-
ing. If the marginal productivity of capital used to produce final good is FK , then
the marginal productivity of capital, accumulated in the whole economy is ξKFK .
Therefore, the marginal social and marginal private returns to capital differ, and
optimal policy offsets this distortion. Private and social returns to capital may dif-
fer also because capital accumulation may impact the division of labour between
production and rent seeking. In addition, just as in previous researches, optimal
policy offsets distortions, which arise from market power. Numerically, optimal
capital income tax is close to zero.
It remains to note that this paper proceeds examination of hypotheses which
contradict the Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) result of zero long run optimal
capital tax. In addition to the case of imperfect competition, the optimal capital
tax in the long run is not zero under uncertainty (Zhu (1992), Chari and Kehoe
(1994), Aiyagari (1995)), if some agents face with liquidity constraints (Hubbard
and Judd (1986)), in the case of incomplete fiscal system (Correia (1896)), or under
no-commitment (Benhabib and Rustichini (1997)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the first section we describe the
economy with rent-seeking agents. Section 2 intuitively derives resource and imple-
mentability constraints, which we use to formulate the Ramsey policy problem; a
formal proof may be found in the appendix. Section 3 poses the Ramsey problem
of optimal policy, gives the first order conditions, and derives steady-state optimal
capital income tax. Section 4 is devoted to numerical estimation of optimal capital
tax rate, section 5 concludes.
1. Model description
A representative household solves the following problem:
(1) max
C,L
∞∫
0
e−ρtu (C,L) dt
(2) A˙ = rA+ wL− pcC
where C is the consumption, L is the labor, ρ is the discount factor, A is the
household’s wealth, r, w and pc are the after-tax capital income, wage and com-
modity price. Household’s wealth consists of physical capital K and government
bonds B, A0 is given. The number of households is normalized to unity and the
producer price of the final good is the numeraire. The first-order conditions are
UC = pcγ(3a)
UL = −wγ(3b)
γ˙ = γ (ρ− r)(3c)
where γ is the co-state variable.
There are two types of business activity: production and rent seeking. To pro-
duce final goods, firms use K1 units of capital and L1 units of labor:
(4) Y = F (K1, L1)
Profit maximization requires:
rˆ + δ = (1− σ)FK(5a)
wˆ = (1− σ)FL(5b)
Where wˆ and rˆ are the before tax wage and the interest rate, and δ is the
depreciation rate. Parameter σ emerges as a result of imperfect competition on the
final goods market and may be measured by the inverse of demand elasticity for
one firm’s output. σ may depend on the resource allocation in the economy.
The profit is given by
(6) pi = F (K1, L1)− (1− σ) [FKK1 + FLL1]
Case σ = 0 corresponds to the situation where all firms are price-takers. Note,
that in this case the profit may still be positive if we assume decreasing returns to
scale.
Rent-seekers compete with each other in order to seize the profit. Probability
of success depends on amounts of capital and labor devoted to rent seeking. The
seeker that achieves higher value of a function Q(K,L) has a higher probability of
success. To be precise, assume that the probability of success of agent i is given by
(7) Probi =
Q(Ki, Li)∑
j Q(Kj , Lj)
,
where Ki, Li is the amount of capital and labor devoted to rent seeking by agent i.
For simplicity we assume that function Q exhibits constant returns to scale. The
problem of agent i takes the following form:
(8) max
Ki,Li
[
Q(Ki, Li)∑
j Q(Kj , Lj)
pi − (rˆ + δ)Ki − wˆLi
]
For simplicity we assume that the depreciation rate in the rent-seeking sector is
the same as in the production sector.
Firms assume all the risks. Rent-seekers’ first-order conditions are:
QK(Ki, Li)
∑
j 6=iQ(Kj , Lj)(∑
j Q(Kj , Lj)
)2pi = (rˆ + δ)(9a)
QL(Ki, Li)
∑
j 6=iQ(Kj , Lj)(∑
j Q(Kj , Lj)
)2pi = wˆ(9b)
Form these conditions we get:
(10)
QK
QL
=
rˆ + δ
wˆ
Free-entry assumption leads to the following market clearing condition:
(11) rˆK2 + wˆL2 = pi
where K2 and L2 are the capital and the labor used to seek the rent in the
economy.
Other market clearing conditions are
(12) Y = C +G+ K˙ + δK
K = K1 +K2(13a)
L = L1 + L2(13b)
The government collects taxes in order to finance an exogenously given amount
of public goods G. Its budget constraint is
(14) B˙ = rB +G− (pc − 1)C − [Y − rK − wL]
The tax rates are determined by ratios of consumer and producer prices. K0, A0,
and B0 are given.
The government solves the Ramsey problem. In other words, it chooses a tax
system, which maximizes the utility of a representative household in decentralized
economy. We confine ourselves to analysis of equilibrium policies, see Arefiev(2008).
2. Attainable allocation set
To derive the optimal policy we use primal approach to optimal taxation, devel-
oped by Ramsey (1927), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Lucas and Stockey (1983),
Chari and Kehoe (1998) and many others. The first step of this approach is to
describe the set of allocations that can be decentralized without lump-sum taxes.
The second one is to maximize utility of a representative agent on this set. The
last one is to find tax rates, which decentralize the optimal allocation.
Attainable allocation set may be described by two constraints: resource and
implementability ones. The resource constraint ensures that the considered allo-
cation is consistent with firms’ optimization: if for a given allocation the resource
constraint is satisfied then there exists a vector of producer prices such that this al-
location satisfies firms’ budget constraints and their first-order conditions 1. In the
same sense the implementability constraint ensures that an allocation is consistent
with the households optimization. If an allocation satisfies the both constraints
then consumers and producers under some prices choose this allocation, and the
1Note, that this definition of the resource constraint diverges from the obvious one. The
obvious resource constraint for the problem at hand is K˙ = F (K,L)− C −G− δK, and not the
constraint we use (20). However, the production possibility frontier, which is given by the obvious
constraint, is not attainable in our problem, because of non-productive use of K2 and L2. Thus,
we augment the resource constraint by the conditions of firms’ optimization. This means that the
Diamond-Mirrlees principle of production efficiency is not satisfied in our framework.
government budget constraint will be satisfied by Walras law. The tax rates that
decentralize the considered allocation are determined by ratios of consumer and
producer prices.
In this section we intuitively derive both constraints from equilibrium condi-
tions, and in the appendix A we prove that these constraints exactly describe the
attainable allocation set.
To get the implementability constraint, consider the value of the household’s
wealth measured in units of utility:
(15) a = γA
Take a derivative of (15) with respect to time and substitute first-order conditions
(3a, 3b, 3c) and household budget constraint (2) into obtained equation:
(16) a˙ = ρa− UCC − ULL
The condition of equilibrium policy gives the value of a0, see Arefiev (2008) for
details.
To get the resource constraint we need to determine how K1 and L1 depend on
K and L. Consider the Cobb-Douglas example: Y = Kα1 L
β
1 , Q = K
φ
2L
1−φ
2 . To
get K1/K ratio, divide the share of K1 income in Y by the share of K = K1 +K2
income in Y . The share of K1 income in Y is (1−σ)α , and the share of K2 income
in Y is equal to the share of K2 income in profit, φ, times the share of profit in Y,
which is [1− (1− σ)(α+ β)]. We get:
(17)
K1
K
=
α(1− σ)
α(1− σ) + φ[1− (1− σ)(α+ β)]
In a similar way:
(18)
L1
L
=
β(1− σ)
β(1− σ) + (1− φ) [1− (1− σ)(α+ β)]
Thus, in the Cobb-Douglas case, the ratios K1/K and L1/L are constants. In a
more general case, α, β and σ may depend on K1 and L1, and φ may depend on
K2 and L2. In this case we get a system of two equations, which implicitly gives
K1 and L1 as functions of K and L. Let’s define
K1 = ξ (K,L)(19a)
L1 = η (K,L)(19b)
Substitution of (19a), (19b) and (4) into (12) gives us the resource constraint:
(20) K˙ = F (ξ (K,L) , η (K,L))− C −G− δK
3. Optimal capital income taxation
The government maximizes utility of a representative household on the set of
allocations, attainable in a decentralized economy:
max
C,L
∞∫
0
e−ρtu (C,L) dt(21a)
a˙ = ρa− UCC − ULL(21b)
K˙ = F (ξ (K,L) , η (K,L))− C −G− δK(21c)
a (0) = a0(21d)
K (0) = K0(21e)
Let λ and µ be co-state variables for a and K. First order conditions are
UC [1− λ (1 +HC)] = µ(22a)
UL [1− λ (1 +HL)] = −µ (FKξL + FLηL)(22b)
λ˙ = 0(22c)
µ˙ = µρ− µ [FKξK + FLηK − δ](22d)
where
(23) Hi =
UCiC + ULiL
Ui
i = C,L
Let ppvc (t) be the present value of the consumer price of the final good, and pˆ
pv
c (t)
be the present value of the producer price of the final good.
ppvc (t) = pc(t)e
− ∫ t0 r(z)dz(24a)
pˆpvc (t) = e
− ∫ t0 rˆ(z)dz(24b)
Let us we introduce the following cumulative tax rate:
(25) T C(t)
C(0)
=
ppvc (t)/p
pv
c (0)
pˆpvc (t)/pˆpvc (0)
=
pc(t)
pc(0)
e
∫ t
0 [rˆ(z)−r(z)]dz
In order to find the optimal value of TC(t)/C(0), first, divide (22a) by (22a),
and substitute γt = γ0eρt−
∫ t
0 r(z)dz and µt = µ0eρt−
∫ t
0 [FKξK+FLηK−δ]dz, which solve
respectively (3c) and (22d). We get the equation, which is analogous to the famous
Judd (1999) multiplier of cumulative capital taxation:
(26) pc(t)[1− λ(1 +HC(t))] = µ0
γ0
e
∫ t
0 (r−[FKξK+FLηK−δ])dz
Then, derive pc(t)pc(0)e
− ∫ t0 r(z)dz from (26), and substitute it to (25). Taking into
account (5a), we get the optimal value of T C(t)
C(0)
:
(27) T ∗C(t)
C(0)
=
1− λ(1 +HC(0))
1− λ(1 +HC(t)) e
∫ t
0 ((1−σ)FK−[FKξK+FLηK ])dz
There is an infinite number of policies, which satisfy (27), and decentralize the
optimal allocation. In order to get the only policy we should normalize the fiscal
system in a particular manner. Assume that the consumption taxation meets the
Ramsey principles of optimal taxation at the micro level, i.e.
(28)
pc(t)
pc(0)
× 1− λ(1 +HC(t))
1− λ(1 +HC(0)) = 1
We assume that the value of pc(0) is chosen to satisfy the condition of equilibrium
policy at t = 0. Then from (25), (27) and (28) we get the following equation, which
implies the optimal capital income tax:
(29) r − rˆ = (1− σ)FK − [FKξK + FLηK ]
Thus, optimal capital tax offsets the difference between private and social mar-
ginal productivity of capital, which is determined by ξK and ηK , and the difference
between before tax interest rate and marginal productivity of capital, which is given
by σ. To be exact, if capital tax τK is defined by (r + δ) = (1− τK) (rˆ + δ), the
optimal value of τK on a balanced growth path is given by
(30) τK = 1−
(
ξK +
FL
FK
ηK
)
1− σ
If σ = ηK = 0, and ξK = 1, we get the celebrated Chamley-Judd result of zero
capital income taxation.
4. Value of optimal capital income tax
Let’s suppose that the shares of K1, K2, L1 and L2 income in Y , and also the
share of profit in Y are constants. From equation (17) we see that in this case
ξK =
α(1− σ)
α(1− σ) + φ[1− (1− σ)(α+ β)](31)
ηK = 0(32)
and the optimal capital income tax is given by
(33) τK = 1−
[(
1− φ
α
(α+ β)
)
(1− σ) + φ
α
]−1
If an economy exhibits constant returns to scale (α + β = 1), and the share of
K1 income in Y equals the share of K2 income in profit (α = φ), then the optimal
capital income tax is zero. To get more general results we need an estimation of
returns to scale and the share of profit in GDP. Guo and Lansing (1999) used the
estimations of Basu and Fernald (1997) and got that the optimal capital income
tax rate is somewhere between -10% and +22%. We take the estimation of returns
to scale in the typical US industry from the same source (Basu, Fernald, 1997), and
hence assume the degree of homogeneity of the production function to be equal to
1,01, and the profit ratio of the typical US industry of about 3%. Let the gross share
of capital income in GDP (the denominator in 31) be equal to 35%. Consequently, in
our framework the optimal capital income tax is somewhere between -4,1% (φ = 0)
and 4,6% (φ = 1).
When no capital is involved in rent-seeking, the capital is subsidized in order to
offset distortions arising from imperfect competition (represented by σ). When all
capital is involved in rent seeking, the effect of discouraging unproductive activity
dominates and the tax rate is positive.
5. Conclusion
Taking account of unproductive use of resources in rent-seeking has allowed us to
compactly pose the Ramsey problem, and to get intuitively clear and interpretable
results. In particular, we found that the optimal capital tax offsets the difference
between private and social marginal productivity of capital (given by ξK and ηK)
and the difference between before tax return on capital and its marginal productiv-
ity (given by σ). The sign of the optimal tax in the long run is ambiguous. On one
extreme, when all capital is tied up in rent seeking, the tax is positive, so that it
distimulates capital accumulation. On the other extreme, when all capital is used
in production, there arises a subsidy, which eliminates the distortions of imperfect
competition. The bounds within which the tax varies are narrower than in previous
works.
Appendix A. Attainable allocation set
Theorem 1. (i) The implementability (21b) and the resource (21c)constraints,
with the initial and transversality conditions (21d), (21e) and lim
t→∞ e
−ρta(t) = 0 ,
are satisfied for any equilibrium allocation [C(t), L(t)]t∈[0,∞).
(ii) If the implementability (21b) and the resource (21c) constraints with the ini-
tial and transversality conditions are satisfied for a given allocation [C(t), L(t)]t∈[0,∞),
then for given dynamics of any tax (τK , τL, τC) there exists the dynamics of the other
two taxes such that this allocation will be implemented in the decentralized economy.
Proof. (i) We get the implementability and the resource constraints from conditions,
which are satisfied for any equilibrium allocation. Consequently, they are also
satisfied for any equilibrium allocation.
The initial condition for the implementability constraint is given by the initial
condition for the market clearing condition (12). The initial condition for a follows
from the equilibrium policy condition, see Arefiev (2008). The transversality condi-
tion for a we derive from the transversality condition forA, limt→∞ e
∫ t
0 −r(z)dzA(t) =
0, the definition of a, equation (15), and equation γ = γ0 exp
(
ρt− ∫ t
0
r(z)dz
)
,
which solves (3c). These equations give limt→∞ e−ρta(t) = 0.
(ii) Suppose that the dynamics of pc is exogenously given (we assume that
pc > 0 ∀t, pc is continuous, and pc(0) verifies the condition of equilibrium pol-
icy at t = 0 for the given value of A(0)). Chose γ, w, and r in such a way that
(3a), (3b), and (3c) are satisfied. Substitution of (3a), (3b), and (3c) into (16)
gives (2), consequently, the household’s budget constraint is also satisfied. The
transversality condition limt→∞ e−ρta(t) = 0 with γ = γ0 exp
(
ρt− ∫ t
0
r(z)dz
)
im-
plies limt→∞ e
∫ t
0 −r(z)dzA(t) = 0.
For a given allocation [C(t), L(t)]t∈(o,∞) and initial value of K(0) = K0, the
resource constraint (20) is a first-order differential equation with respect to K(t),
which has a unique backward-looking solution. For given trajectories of K and L,
the production function (4) gives the dynamics of Y . Thus, we get the dynamics
of K, and Y, which verifies (4) and (12).
Take the values of rˆ and wˆ, which verify (5). Equation (6) gives the value
of profit, which corresponds to the allocation under consideration. The functions
ξ(K,L) and η(K,L) solve the system of equations (17) and (18), consequently,
these equations are also satisfied. Substitution of the shares α, β, and φ into these
equations gives:
QK
QKK2 +QLL2
=
rˆ + δ
pi
(34a)
QL
QKK2 +QLL2
=
wˆ
pi
(34b)
If we divide (34a) by (34b), we get the rent-seekers’ optimality conditions (10),
consequently, they are satisfied. Multiply (34a) by K2, (34b) by L2 and, sum up
the two term. We get (11), consequently, the free-entry condition is also satisfied.
The government budget constraint is satisfied by Walras low. The fiscal system,
which decentralize the allocation, is impled by respective ratios of consumer to
producer prices.
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